JSON path injection via unescaped get_path segments in AshSqlite
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.2.18 and 2138480fceb654bec1845e691517ac409d0232c3.
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in ash-project ash_sqlite allows an attacker who controls a get_path/2 segment to traverse into nested JSON the application never exposed, disclosing private or sensitive? embedded fields. AshSqlite.SqlImplementation builds the SQLite json_extract path with "$." <> Enum.join(right, "."), so a single segment containing ., [, ], or $ re-interprets the JSON path (for example "private.secret" descends two levels instead of naming one key). The path is bound as a parameter, so this is confined to the JSON-path grammar rather than SQL. Any endpoint that lets user input reach a get_path segment (a common pick-a-field pattern) can read nested values it never meant to expose. This issue affects ash_sqlite: from 0.1.2-rc.0 before 0.2.18.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=0.1.2-rc.0 <0.2.18, >=c12be48a5b6295593199b0e445b70a4aef81d1cd <2138480fceb654bec1845e691517ac409d0232c3 | 0.2.18, 2138480fceb654bec1845e691517ac409d0232c3 |
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