Unbounded atom creation from typed struct field names in AshTypescript field selector
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.18.0 and 0ab5c83a7df28d51a6de1fb9b859a142b2b12919.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the BEAM atom table and abort the node via client-supplied typed struct field names. resolve_typed_struct_field/2 in lib/ash_typescript/rpc/field_processing/field_selector.ex looks a client-supplied field name up in the typed struct's reverse map and, when it finds no match, falls back to String.to_atom/1. Because this runs before any field-existence check, an unresolvable name mints a permanent atom rather than being rejected as unknown. Atoms are never garbage collected, so a request carrying many distinct names on a typed struct field grows the atom table until the VM aborts at its limit. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=0.11.0 <0.18.0, >=7c3d30896f2f9a54edea17e3787549776b1b288d <0ab5c83a7df28d51a6de1fb9b859a142b2b12919 | 0.18.0, 0ab5c83a7df28d51a6de1fb9b859a142b2b12919 |
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