SSRF protection bypass in safeurl via IPv6 addresses and unresolvable hosts
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in *.
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Slab safeurl allows an attacker who controls a validated URL to reach internal network destinations the library is configured to block. Only IPv4 addresses are matched against the reserved ranges and the blocklist. Every other address is treated as matching nothing, so a destination that is rejected in its IPv4 form is accepted when written as an IPv6 address, IPv6 entries in the blocklist never match, and a host that resolves to no IPv4 address is accepted regardless of where it points. Deployments that rely on the allowlist instead are unaffected, because there an unmatched address is rejected. This issue affects safeurl: from 0.1.0 onward.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Slab | =0.1.0, =feabbd0a13f83028ab24b71710526e9da9841f70 | * |
Timeline
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