Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO < 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS < 6.4, SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps < 6.4
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO < 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS < 6.4, SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps < 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| miniorange.com | =1.0.0-6.3.0, =1.0.0-13.1.0, =1.0.0-44.1.0, =1.0.0-11.0.1, =1.0.0-34.1.0, =1.0.0-24.1.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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