Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in *, 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.14.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3 reads the :token argument and decodes it with AshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1, which delegates to Joken.peek_claims/1 and performs no signature check, unlike Jwt.verify/4. The jti, exp and sub claims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only by byte_size(token) > 0. Because expires_at derives from the attacker-chosen exp, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the real jti but backdates exp yields a revocation row that is already expired: expunge_expired removes it and the genuine token passes revoked? again. Arbitrary jti and sub values can be inserted the same way. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | =a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231, >=0.2.0 <4.15.0, >=5.0.0-rc.0 <5.0.0-rc.14 | *, 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14 |
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