Ech0 before 4.7.3 OAuth Redirect URI Validation Bypass
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 4.7.3.
Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| lin-snow | <4.7.3 | 4.7.3 |
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