APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 Missing Authentication on the Internal Account Closure Endpoints
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account's email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| apitable | <=1.13.0-beta.1 |
Timeline
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