Validating resolver can abort while caching a mismatched NOQNAME proof
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
If a BIND resolver sends a query for a DNSSEC-signed authoritative zone, and the authoritative server replies with a valid wildcard answer and signed NSEC3 proof, followed by an unsigned NSEC at the same owner name, it will trigger an unexpected program exit. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.27, 9.21.0 through 9.21.25, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.27-S1.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISC | BIND | >=9.11.0 <=9.18.50, >=9.11.3-S1 <=9.18.50-S1, >=9.20.0 <=9.20.27, >=9.20.9-S1 <=9.20.27-S1, >=9.21.0 <=9.21.25 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in BIND, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket