sysctl: move the "cad_pid" entry from pid_table[] to kern_reboot_table[]
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 7170ca01623b399c97f2ae9d3e228badc1f25ea3, Kernel a09bc4eaa67e1a72df3b6d0beb3afeef1e1fdfcd and Kernel e8527de7fea191fda704792a56081f9009aeec37.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sysctl: move the "cad_pid" entry from pid_table[] to kern_reboot_table[] cad_pid is global, and kill_cad_pid() is only used in the root namespace. However, due to pid_table_root_permissions(), a non-root user can unshare pid/user namespaces and modify it from the child namespace. This makes no sense and is simply wrong. Move it to kern_reboot_table[] where it logically belongs; this ensures that only GLOBAL_ROOT_UID can read/modify this sysctl. Note that this patch doesn't preserve "#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL" around the "cad_pid"; CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL selects CONFIG_SYSCTL, so it is always set when kern_reboot_table[] is compiled.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.17, >=e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e <7170ca01623b399c97f2ae9d3e228badc1f25ea3, >=e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e <a09bc4eaa67e1a72df3b6d0beb3afeef1e1fdfcd, >=e054bcbe7e7af2baad3752f1a4916a7fffc0457e <e8527de7fea191fda704792a56081f9009aeec37 | 7170ca01623b399c97f2ae9d3e228badc1f25ea3, a09bc4eaa67e1a72df3b6d0beb3afeef1e1fdfcd, e8527de7fea191fda704792a56081f9009aeec37 |
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