dm-pcache: validate on-media seg_num against the cache device size
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 62d92e45abe9e087370f9fc5d876b95673aced34, Kernel 91b93fe5cf4d62d5ecc642a6c8f15a3c11b00e3c and Kernel e889c0ee81165fc90aad2979b51f930f77895703.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate on-media seg_num against the cache device size seg_num is read from the crc32c-only superblock, so whoever supplies the cache device on a table load (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) controls it. It sizes cache->segments[] and is the value every later on-media segment id is bounded against, yet it is never checked against the device. Because cache_dev->mapping is the direct map of the pmem, CACHE_DEV_SEGMENT() for a segment id past the device resolves to ordinary kernel memory beyond the mapping; a new-cache init reaching such an id has cache_seg_init() -> cache_dev_zero_range() memset() 12 KiB over that memory -- an out-of-bounds write into the kernel heap at table load. A zero seg_num makes the segment allocations ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Reject a seg_num that is zero, larger than the device can hold, or larger than PCACHE_CACHE_SEGS_MAX before it is used.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.18, >=1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 <62d92e45abe9e087370f9fc5d876b95673aced34, >=1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 <91b93fe5cf4d62d5ecc642a6c8f15a3c11b00e3c, >=1d57628ff95b32d5cfa8d8f50e07690c161e9cf0 <e889c0ee81165fc90aad2979b51f930f77895703 | 62d92e45abe9e087370f9fc5d876b95673aced34, 91b93fe5cf4d62d5ecc642a6c8f15a3c11b00e3c, e889c0ee81165fc90aad2979b51f930f77895703 |
Timeline
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