mcp-use Inspector Proxy Server-Side Request Forgery via Caller-Supplied Target URL
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
The proxy middleware in mcp-use's inspector forwards requests to a destination the caller names. mountMcpProxy in libraries/typescript/packages/mcp-use/src/server/middleware/mcp-proxy.ts read the target from the X-Target-URL header or the __mcp_target parameter and proxied to it without inspecting the host, so loopback, link-local and private addresses were all accepted, as were names that resolve to them, and the validation was not reapplied to a redirect the destination returned. A caller could therefore make the server issue requests to addresses reachable only from the host it runs on and read the responses. In mcp-use 2.x the proxy moved to the @mcp-use/inspector package, whose mcp-proxy.ts calls isSafeProxyTarget, which checks the resolved address against private, loopback and link-local ranges before proxying and bounds the number of redirects followed.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| mcp-use | <=1.34.8 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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