Ash.Type.CiString validates length and match constraints before case folding, allowing constraint bypass
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 3.32.2 and d8320b0127c8ef453679d70e5dd23a9506951d21.
Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker store a case-insensitive string value that violates its length or match constraints. Ash.Type.CiString.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/ci_string.ex) validated the max_length, min_length, and match constraints against the value as submitted, while the type case-folds the string (per its casing) for storage and comparison. Because validation ran before folding, an attacker can submit a value whose folded form breaks a constraint but whose original form passes: for example, against a match pattern requiring uppercase, an uppercase value that is stored lowercased persists a value the pattern rejects. The fix case-folds the value at the start of apply_constraints/2, so the constraints are checked against the form that is actually stored. This issue affects ash: from 1.29.0-rc0 before 3.32.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | >=1.29.0-rc0 <3.32.2, >=f6f5d194bfc7802bd32e48bf2eabd2d97a0109a4 <d8320b0127c8ef453679d70e5dd23a9506951d21 | 3.32.2, d8320b0127c8ef453679d70e5dd23a9506951d21 |
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