ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping 1.6.0.
ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| mayswind | >=0.10.0 <1.6.0 | ||
| go: github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping | >=0.10.0 <1.6.0 | 1.6.0 |
Timeline
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