Foreman: authorization flaw in the foreman::controller::useraware#find_user handling used by api::v2::personalaccesstokenscontroller
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
A flaw was found in Foreman’s Api::V2::PersonalAccessTokensController, where Foreman::Controller::UserAware#find_user resolves the target account using User.find(params[:user_id]) without applying the required parent-user authorization check. An attacker with the create_personal_access_tokens permission can therefore invoke POST /api/v2/users/:user_id/personal_access_tokens with another user’s ID and create a Personal Access Token on their behalf. The resulting plaintext token is returned in the API response, while PersonalAccessToken#check_permissions_after_save only validates create_personal_access_tokens on the token and does not enforce edit_users authorization on the target user. The attacker can then use the forged token to authenticate as the victim, potentially resulting in complete account takeover, including administrator accounts.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Satellite |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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