MISP User Homepage Validation Allows Authenticated Open Redirect via Protocol-Relative URL
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers. The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login. The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation. Version affected: ≤2.5.45
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | <=2.5.45 |
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