Busybox: busybox: udhcpc integer underflow in dhcp packet length calculation causes denial of service
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment can send a specially crafted packet to crash the DHCP client, resulting in denial of service and loss of network connectivity.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Enterprise Linux | ||
| Red Hat | Hardened Images |
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