ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Kernel eb3e1a1cb1634c76d59c5a9cb1a026fc69d40911, Kernel 0c4bcc3ba7291d383b82ce1c2fe324f69a42da2d, Kernel 332c444f4dc6fa1e8b8637c9e82d29e97f768656 and 12 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3 ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <eb3e1a1cb1634c76d59c5a9cb1a026fc69d40911, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <0c4bcc3ba7291d383b82ce1c2fe324f69a42da2d, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <332c444f4dc6fa1e8b8637c9e82d29e97f768656, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <3bf7dba8dba9a05774b846affec61a3624ddba38, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <55a06b32438c222765138727d0a8164b103e8f0d, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <58c2d3e954c13694ef6e820a5e9456461bb9e7df, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3, >=d463a43d69f4af85887671d76182437775fd1631 <a6eaf7bd229d0940ba8f126c684a663a680abef1, =4.7 | eb3e1a1cb1634c76d59c5a9cb1a026fc69d40911, 0c4bcc3ba7291d383b82ce1c2fe324f69a42da2d, 332c444f4dc6fa1e8b8637c9e82d29e97f768656, 3bf7dba8dba9a05774b846affec61a3624ddba38, 55a06b32438c222765138727d0a8164b103e8f0d, 58c2d3e954c13694ef6e820a5e9456461bb9e7df, a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3, a6eaf7bd229d0940ba8f126c684a663a680abef1 |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=5.11.0 <5.15.221, >=5.16.0 <6.1.188, >=6.13.0 <6.18.50, >=6.19.0 <7.2.4, >=6.2.0 <6.6.157, >=6.7.0 <6.12.109, >=4.7.0 <5.10.273 | 5.15.221, 6.1.188, 6.18.50, 7.2.4, 6.6.157, 6.12.109, 5.10.273 |
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