crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b, Kernel d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2 and Kernel ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone() currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report a slab OOB write. Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size, copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.16, >=097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a <889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b, >=097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a <d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2, >=097c432caaa6d91f87732fe991cb08139e31101a <ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880 | 889fa17a0af09ff93a9166abc82ee7a654faa49b, d48197cbd5d3476c7deea644972e9ec510865ec2, ee440d4fc0d2f15894ab1f64c474a3adbc858880 |
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