Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d, Kernel 22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354 and Kernel a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data, without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it. h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8 byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data. Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is truncated.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.15, >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d, >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354, >=998e447f443f138c90faa6ff3845082af419070e <a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393 | 060fa7592bdc043a93b6b7870f5b8551206d315d, 22d419db7f9a01bea22cfcf66774d2b2fd4bb354, a644b8df94966b672ac656577df98bd01bc88393 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Kernel, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket