dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 388c3f6496bb8083576d989e6d249ba9807c6b0b, Kernel 5c58ea19a909ef6bed4f0f824e9cd7e30d7e4775, Kernel 6228722c27304e4682cddc1fede03898f87e4414 and 1 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic. Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by integrity_discard_checksum().
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =5.7, >=84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 <388c3f6496bb8083576d989e6d249ba9807c6b0b, >=84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 <5c58ea19a909ef6bed4f0f824e9cd7e30d7e4775, >=84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 <6228722c27304e4682cddc1fede03898f87e4414, >=84597a44a9d86ac949900441cea7da0af0f2f473 <68c5c42567bc462139128968ebbfadd0aefff519 | 388c3f6496bb8083576d989e6d249ba9807c6b0b, 5c58ea19a909ef6bed4f0f824e9cd7e30d7e4775, 6228722c27304e4682cddc1fede03898f87e4414, 68c5c42567bc462139128968ebbfadd0aefff519 |
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