Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| home-assistant | <2026.2.3 |
Timeline
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