Mint HTTP/2 client buffers oversized frames up to 16 MiB before enforcing max_frame_size
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in * and 1.10.2.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/2 server to make the client hold up to about 16 MiB per connection in frames it should reject, consuming client memory. Mint.HTTP2.Frame.decode_next/2 in lib/mint/http2/frame.ex compares a frame with the client's max_frame_size (16,384 bytes by default) only once the whole declared payload has arrived. Until then it returns :more, and Mint.HTTP2 keeps every received byte in the connection buffer. A server can declare a frame length of up to 16,777,215 bytes and withhold the last byte, keeping roughly 1,024 times the advertised limit buffered for as long as the connection stays open. The server has to send every byte the client buffers, so there is no amplification, and the buffer stops at the 24-bit frame length limit. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.2.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-mint | =596ca4304504be68939c4929e0831557097962b8, >=0.1.0 <1.10.2 | *, 1.10.2 |
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