FastNetMon: sFlow header_size field trusted as parser capture length causes remote out-of-bounds read
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
FastNetMon is a high-performance DDoS detector and sensor. In version 1.2.9 and earlier, process_sflow_flow_sample() in src/sflow_plugin/sflow_collector.cpp passes the attacker-controlled sflow_raw_protocol_header_t.header_size to parse_raw_packet_to_simple_packet_full() as its trusted captured length without comparing it with the bytes remaining in the record. An inflated header_size creates a false end pointer beyond the received sFlow v5 UDP buffer, defeating the nested parser's bounds checks and causing an unauthenticated remote out-of-bounds read and process crash, with possible limited exposure of adjacent bytes through parsed flow fields. No fixed release is available as of this review.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| pavel-odintsov | <=1.2.9 |
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