Cocos AI: Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to session-misbinding attacks for Intel TDX verifier path
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. In Cocos AI 0.8.2 and earlier, VerifTeeAttestation in the Intel TDX aTLS verifier receives an expected current-session value but does not apply it to TdQuoteBodyPolicy.ReportData before validating TDX QuoteV4 evidence. The verifier can consequently accept structurally valid evidence containing mismatched or reused REPORT_DATA for the current TLS session, causing the relying party to release application data or make a trust or authorization decision for an unrelated attestation context. This issue was fixed in Cocos AI 0.9.0 by removing the affected verifier path as part of the migration to post-handshake attestation.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ultravioletrs | <0.9.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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