Cocos AI: Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation can accept Evidence with nil, empty, or omitted reportData in the AMD SEV-SNP path
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. In Cocos AI 0.8.2 and earlier, VerifyAttestationReportTLS in the AMD SEV-SNP verifier sets Policy.ReportData only when its caller supplies non-empty expected reportData. A relying-party integration that passes nil or empty expected reportData while relying on that value for current-session freshness can therefore accept SEV-SNP evidence unrelated to the current connection and make a trust, authorization, or application-data release decision for an unintended attestation context. This issue was fixed in Cocos AI 0.9.0 by removing the affected verifier path as part of the migration to post-handshake attestation.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ultravioletrs | <0.9.0 |
Timeline
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