Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System <= 28.2 - Insecure Direct Object Reference to Unauthenticated Arbitrary Booking Token Disclosure and Deletion via 'order_id' Parameter
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 28.2 via the 'bookly_get_form_id', 'bookly_render_complete', 'bookly_add_to_calendar' and 'bookly_rollback_order' AJAX actions. This is due to the 'bookly_get_form_id' handler blindly storing the attacker-controlled 'order_id' from the submitted form_data into a new booking session, which the 'bookly_render_complete' handler then trusts to look up and return the corresponding Order's secret token without verifying that the current session created that order. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential order IDs, disclose other customers' order tokens, retrieve calendar/appointment information via 'bookly_add_to_calendar' and permanently delete arbitrary non-completed bookings via 'bookly_rollback_order', which cascade-deletes the customer_appointment and (when no other customers are attached) the underlying appointment.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ladela | <=28.2 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
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