xdg-dbus-proxy: message filtering bypass via reply serial allows sandbox escape
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 0.1.9.
An incorrect implementation of message filtering in xdg-dbus-proxy versions before 0.1.9 allows an attacker to bypass the intended message filtering on the D-Bus session bus by setting a reply serial number on non-reply messages. A malicious or compromised Flatpak app could use this to achieve arbitrary code execution outside its sandbox. xdg-dbus-proxy was designed to be part of the sandbox boundary for Flatpak, but it is released as a separate project and is sometimes used by other app frameworks such as Firejail.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fedora | <0.1.9 | 0.1.9 | |
| Red Hat | Enterprise Linux | ||
| <0.1.9 | 0.1.9 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
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