Cloak AES-CTR cipher lacks ciphertext authentication, allowing chosen-plaintext forgery by bit flipping
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in *.
Reliance on Obfuscation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without Integrity Checking vulnerability in danielberkompas cloak allows an attacker with write access to stored ciphertext to make it decrypt to a chosen value via bit flipping. Cloak.Ciphers.AES.CTR encrypts with AES-256 in CTR mode and stores the key tag, the IV and the ciphertext with no MAC. decrypt/2 checks only the key tag and the minimum length before it returns the plaintext, and Cloak.Ciphers.Deprecated.AES.CTR decrypts the legacy format the same way. CTR is a stream cipher, so a value XORed into the stored ciphertext is XORed into the plaintext at the same offset. An attacker who can write to the encrypted store (for example through SQL injection or a compromised replica) and who knows or can guess a stored plaintext can replace it with any value of the same length. The application receives that value with no error. This issue affects cloak: from 0.1.0-pre onward.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| danielberkompas | =0.1.0-pre, =2bd17019e285b55c5c218cc842537bf9280f24c3 | * |
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