Flag sanitization bypass via "#cgo pkg-config:" directives in cmd/go
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in 1.26.11, 1.27.4 and toolchain 1.27.4.
Building a malicious package that uses "#cgo pkg-config:" directives could load untrusted pkg-config ".pc" files or inject unvalidated compiler and linker flags. The pkg-config flag allowlist previously permitted "--with-path=" and "--personality=", allowed "--define-variable=" values beginning with "=" or "$" (which can rewrite paths in system ".pc" files into sysroot-prefixed "-L=" or "-L$SYSROOT" linker search paths), and allowed package arguments ending in ".pc" or containing path separators or "..", which caused pkg-config to load local ".pc" files directly from the package directory. In addition, flags returned by "pkg-config --cflags" in cgoCPPFLAGS were not checked when determining whether internal linking is safe. The go command now disallows "--with-path=", "--personality=", leading "=" or "$" characters in "--define-variable=" values, and local ".pc" paths in "#cgo pkg-config:" directives, and inspects cgoCPPFLAGS when checking internal linking compatibility.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go toolchain | <1.26.11, >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.4 | 1.26.11, 1.27.4 | |
| go: toolchain | >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.4 | 1.27.4 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in toolchain (Go), strongest first
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