Unexpected code execution via escaped quotes in //go:cgo_ldflag in cmd/go and cmd/compile
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in 1.26.11, 1.27.4 and toolchain 1.27.4.
Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass "#cgo LDFLAGS" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in "//go:cgo_ldflag" directives. When "cmd/cgo" generates "_cgo_gotypes.go", it quotes each "#cgo LDFLAGS" argument with strconv.Quote in a "//go:cgo_ldflag" directive, but "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command's flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote "//go:cgo_*" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go toolchain | <1.26.11, >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.4 | 1.26.11, 1.27.4 | |
| go: toolchain | >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.4 | 1.27.4 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in toolchain (Go), strongest first
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