Keycloak-services: keycloak-services: client manager can substitute sessionless token principal via hardcoded-claim mappers to obtain realm administrator authority
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
A flaw was found in the protocol mapper and identity resolution components of Keycloak. The issue occurs when a client manager uses hardcoded-claim mappers to override identity claims in sessionless service-account tokens. Because these tokens lack a session ID, Keycloak may incorrectly resolve the token bearer as a different, highly privileged user based on the manipulated claims. This can allow an attacker with limited client management permissions to impersonate a realm administrator and gain full control over the realm.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Build of Keycloak | ||
| Red Hat | Single Sign-On |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Red Hat, strongest first
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