ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel c3576cb77b527f223cf2b9fc2b2e9af5e7adee25, Kernel 2770321b358658e0a39fe39ccf6a91ee97a81931, Kernel 8f5ef203abda9dd36b2af473c7b737d544f807bd and 6 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible ctl_snapshot[] array. Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer, and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short transfers while still resubmitting the URB.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c3576cb77b527f223cf2b9fc2b2e9af5e7adee25, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <2770321b358658e0a39fe39ccf6a91ee97a81931, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <8f5ef203abda9dd36b2af473c7b737d544f807bd, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <b0c30fe6c0d5902bd8a7d1d5720bead5bbe46f7d, >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c156584999bf15118f523ef6c6fedc5b21f46bd9, =2.6.12 | c3576cb77b527f223cf2b9fc2b2e9af5e7adee25, 2770321b358658e0a39fe39ccf6a91ee97a81931, 8f5ef203abda9dd36b2af473c7b737d544f807bd, b0c30fe6c0d5902bd8a7d1d5720bead5bbe46f7d, c156584999bf15118f523ef6c6fedc5b21f46bd9 |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=6.13.0 <6.18.53, >=6.19.0 <7.2.7, >=6.7.0 <6.12.111, >=2.6.12 <6.6.160 | 6.18.53, 7.2.7, 6.12.111, 6.6.160 |
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