CVE-2026-98151

published 25 Sep 2026 · updated 12 Nov 2026

bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic

5.5MediumCVSS 5.5EPSS 0%

No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0, Kernel 21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8, Kernel 9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4 and 1 more.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION on speculative pointer arithmetic Take the following unprivileged program as an example: r0 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(...) /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, offset 0 */ ... 14: r0 += r1 /* r1 is a bounded scalar */ 15: r9 = r0 Loading it triggers a verifier warning from reg_bounds_sanity_check(): verifier bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (alu): const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds r64={.base=0x0, .size=0x0} r32={.base=0x0, .size=0xffffffff} var_off=(0x0, 0x0) What happens: 1. Processing insn 14 (r0 += r1) in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the new offset is computed into dst_reg's var_off and 32/64-bit ranges. 2. Because pointer registers do not track 32-bit subregister bounds, __mark_reg32_unbounded() first sets r32 to the full range; r32 is re-derived from the offset at the end of the function by reg_bounds_sync(). 3. On the unprivileged path, sanitize_ptr_alu() is called and, via sanitize_speculative_path() -> push_stack(), snapshots the current register state and schedules the next instruction (insn 15) to be verified directly as a speculative path. 4. That snapshot is taken between step 2 and the final reg_bounds_sync(): at this point dst_reg's var_off still holds the (const) original offset while r32 has just been blanked to the full range, i.e. the two are out of sync. When the speculative path later verifies insn 15 (r9 = r0), the inconsistent state reaches reg_bounds_sanity_check() and trips the warning. var_off and the 32-bit range must always be consistent. There are two ways to keep the snapshot consistent: 1. sync var_off and r32 before the snapshot so they match, or 2. leave r32 at its original (already consistent) value and blank it only after the snapshot. The whole point of sanitize_ptr_alu() is to insert a harmless masking sequence that keeps the access in bounds under speculation, so the state it snapshots should faithfully represent that. Take approach 2: move __mark_reg32_unbounded() to after sanitize_ptr_alu(), so the speculative snapshot keeps the pointer's original, consistent r32. The non-speculative path is unchanged: r32 is still blanked before the offset is applied and re-derived by reg_bounds_sync().

Affected

Vendors, products and packages with version ranges

VendorProductVersionsFixed
LinuxKernel=6.8, >=5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f <150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0, >=5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f <21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8, >=5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f <9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4, >=5f99f312bd3bedb3b266b0d26376a8c500cdc97f <d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6150aeba624e8b7cac51c39440d7e8e1fd11de9a0, 21a681526c715aebb4f918b8c131583442d1b3d8, 9f9477ae73de9c5a28e8ab7000d8097b078faee4, d623a4a58bb238443505d5c2949d1182dcfc26b6

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