tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random()
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 42bb6216b861e892512128219ff23010d656ba14, Kernel 9b522400bf5c082feb9a0037a053ea822a2c7e4d, Kernel be54101992c2c5218be0e0a87827ccc96e3089af and 1 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random() When the response carries the TPM2_ST_SESSIONS tag, tpm2_get_random() skips the 4-byte parameter size field before locating the random data, but the bounds check still validates the response length against TPM_HEADER_SIZE. A truncated response can pass the check and make memcpy() read up to 4 bytes past the response end, so stale buffer contents end up in the caller's random bytes. Fix this by checking the response length against 'offset', which already includes the skipped parameter size field.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.10, >=1b6d7f9eb150305dcb0da4f7101a8d30dcdf0497 <42bb6216b861e892512128219ff23010d656ba14, >=1b6d7f9eb150305dcb0da4f7101a8d30dcdf0497 <9b522400bf5c082feb9a0037a053ea822a2c7e4d, >=1b6d7f9eb150305dcb0da4f7101a8d30dcdf0497 <be54101992c2c5218be0e0a87827ccc96e3089af, >=1b6d7f9eb150305dcb0da4f7101a8d30dcdf0497 <e30a2406408d2df6d9cd48c2e59e913cf266a05a | 42bb6216b861e892512128219ff23010d656ba14, 9b522400bf5c082feb9a0037a053ea822a2c7e4d, be54101992c2c5218be0e0a87827ccc96e3089af, e30a2406408d2df6d9cd48c2e59e913cf266a05a |
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