futex: Fix private hash use-after-free on resize
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 5d5dc18b3a9ac011619b7d3af4514bf9e9b6a6af and Kernel f35e3b5784221654f9cdbd6222275a7fa203f6c3.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Fix private hash use-after-free on resize poll_state_synchronize_rcu(mm->futex.phash.batches) is used by futex_ref_drop() to check that a grace period has passed since the current hash was published. This relies on batches referencing a grace period which started after the hash pointer was assigned. __futex_pivot_hash() sets mmph->batches before it replaces mmph->hash: scoped_guard(rcu) { mmph->batches = get_state_synchronize_rcu(); rcu_assign_pointer(mmph->hash, new); } The scoped_guard(rcu) doesn't stop new grace periods from starting, and if one starts between those two assignments, futex_ref_drop() can move forward while a reader still holds a pointer to the old hash. Fix things by setting mmph->batches after assigning mmph->hash. The scoped_guard(rcu) isn't needed, so let's drop that as well.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.17, >=56180dd20c19e5b0fa34822997a9ac66b517e7b3 <5d5dc18b3a9ac011619b7d3af4514bf9e9b6a6af, >=56180dd20c19e5b0fa34822997a9ac66b517e7b3 <f35e3b5784221654f9cdbd6222275a7fa203f6c3 | 5d5dc18b3a9ac011619b7d3af4514bf9e9b6a6af, f35e3b5784221654f9cdbd6222275a7fa203f6c3 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Kernel, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket