wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. Fixed in Kernel 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20, Kernel 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a, Kernel 6b5b14cb5421e84191e3f6b5a7566783a402ff7f and 5 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =5.6, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <6b5b14cb5421e84191e3f6b5a7566783a402ff7f, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <dbd1e21f4301bd2157cd771255f1ca6ba1c8a1f9, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <f4012ec25a4abb6a23dc40043f61e2d9a7deca6d, >=e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd <fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295 | 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20, 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a, 6b5b14cb5421e84191e3f6b5a7566783a402ff7f, c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04, d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e, dbd1e21f4301bd2157cd771255f1ca6ba1c8a1f9, f4012ec25a4abb6a23dc40043f61e2d9a7deca6d, fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295 |
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