dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow in inline mode with large tag size
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel 3c7aad85aeb9e28386672e3a009aa2e61f751b86, Kernel 4f0ee735dc68e3e6c4dd9a666d7f7047163c4165, Kernel 764b683a6180fd72c931c13fea98d383506a3475 and 1 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow in inline mode with large tag size In inline mode, dm_integrity_check and dm_integrity_inline_recheck compute the checksum of each block into an on-stack buffer of HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE bytes. integrity_sector_checksum pads its result with zeroes up to the tag size, so if the tag size is larger than HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, the padding runs past the end of the buffer. With CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR the kernel panics in dm_integrity_check on the first read. Enlarge both buffers to hold MAX_TAG_SIZE bytes, as commit b93b6643e9b5 ("dm integrity: fix a crash with unusually large tag size") did for integrity_metadata. Note that this is not a security bug because the buffer overflow can only be triggered by root.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | =6.11, >=fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 <3c7aad85aeb9e28386672e3a009aa2e61f751b86, >=fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 <4f0ee735dc68e3e6c4dd9a666d7f7047163c4165, >=fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 <764b683a6180fd72c931c13fea98d383506a3475, >=fb0987682c629c1d2c476f35f6fde405a5e304a4 <f49cd7820cd0a96f20e1aa2708adb002124e38a7 | 3c7aad85aeb9e28386672e3a009aa2e61f751b86, 4f0ee735dc68e3e6c4dd9a666d7f7047163c4165, 764b683a6180fd72c931c13fea98d383506a3475, f49cd7820cd0a96f20e1aa2708adb002124e38a7 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Kernel, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket