sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in Kernel fb28092f5feec64f506f198f56d676ba752e700c, Kernel 0ff27cefd26182be8366c414478967d667bd8e86, Kernel 28fb74ed3118cd3f59e1b0a5bdba691a2a4c7ea3 and 4 more.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause() sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq. Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload. Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Kernel | >=8914f4bace3f3a56f14accb45f9f4b9456670b4a <fb28092f5feec64f506f198f56d676ba752e700c, >=8914f4bace3f3a56f14accb45f9f4b9456670b4a <0ff27cefd26182be8366c414478967d667bd8e86, >=8914f4bace3f3a56f14accb45f9f4b9456670b4a <28fb74ed3118cd3f59e1b0a5bdba691a2a4c7ea3, >=8914f4bace3f3a56f14accb45f9f4b9456670b4a <ed6c53b27be492643da2017c6f8e2732be5edf1a, =4.18 | fb28092f5feec64f506f198f56d676ba752e700c, 0ff27cefd26182be8366c414478967d667bd8e86, 28fb74ed3118cd3f59e1b0a5bdba691a2a4c7ea3, ed6c53b27be492643da2017c6f8e2732be5edf1a |
| linux-kernel: Kernel | >=6.13.0 <6.18.64, >=6.19.0 <7.3.5, >=4.18.0 <6.12.118 | 6.18.64, 7.3.5, 6.12.118 |
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