Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75.
Kubeshark is an eBPF-powered network observability tool for Kubernetes. From 53.1.0 until 53.4.0, the download_file tool in cmd/mcpRunner.go accepts caller-controlled path and dest values, fetches a selected Kubeshark Hub API response, and writes the returned bytes through os.Create(dest) in callDownloadFile without confining the destination. An attacker who influences arguments through an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp can write Hub-supplied bytes to any path writable by the local MCP user and can read captured network traffic from default auth-disabled Hub deployments. The tool is registered without --allow-destructive; reliable code execution is not demonstrated because the bytes are constrained to Hub API responses. Hub-side default authentication remains outside this remediation, so captured traffic can remain readable in default auth-disabled Hub deployments after the local destination-write fix. The destination-write issue is fixed in version 53.4.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| kubeshark | >=53.1.0 <53.4.0 | ||
| go: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark | >=0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0 <0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 | 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (Go), strongest first
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