Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75.
Kubeshark is an eBPF-powered network observability tool for Kubernetes. From 53.1.0 until 53.4.0, the start_kubeshark MCP tool in cmd/mcpRunner.go uses callStartKubeshark to append caller-controlled pod_regex as a bare positional argument to kubeshark tap without a -- end-of-options separator, allowing a value beginning with --set to be parsed as a Helm value override. An attacker who influences tool arguments against kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive can redirect the privileged worker, Hub, and front images through tap.docker.registry and tap.docker.tag to an attacker-controlled registry. Because the deployed worker DaemonSet runs privileged with host networking and host filesystem access, a malicious image can obtain node and cluster-admin access when the host already has permission to deploy it. This issue is fixed in version 53.4.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| kubeshark | >=53.1.0 <53.4.0 | ||
| go: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark | >=0.0.2-0.20260206182249-0bbbb473ea3f <0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 | 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (Go), strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket