qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in go.qbee.io/agent 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849.
qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.41, the unpackTar extraction logic in app/utils/tar.go validates cleaned archive entry paths with strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) without enforcing a path-separator boundary. When UseContext enables the Docker Compose build context path in app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go, a less-privileged archive supplier with delegated configuration and/or file-manager access can provide a sibling-prefix traversal entry that passes the check, causing utils.UnpackTar to create directories and regular files outside the intended context extraction directory with qbee-agent process privileges, despite the supplier lacking authority to write those sibling files. In deployments where only full device or fleet administrators can provide Docker Compose context archives, this behavior is hardening rather than a crossed security boundary. The demonstrated impact is limited to nearby cache or project paths sharing the destination prefix, may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, and does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.41.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| qbee-io | <2026.41 | ||
| go: go.qbee.io/agent | <0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849 | 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in go.qbee.io/agent (Go), strongest first
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