qbee-agent: Local Privilege Escalation and Arbitrary File Tampering via Symlink Following in createFile helper
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. Fixed in go.qbee.io/agent 0.0.0-20260615134032-0fdf8e411de5.
qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.27, the privileged createFile helper followed attacker-controlled symbolic links during file creation. A local unprivileged user whose account is managed by the SSH Keys bundle could replace ~/.ssh with a link to /root/.ssh, causing the agent to write an authorized key for root. On systems using RAUC download mode with ineffective kernel symlink protection, the predictable /tmp/.bundle.raucb.part path could be linked to a system file and then overwritten or truncated during an update. A file-distribution destination beneath an attacker-controlled directory could similarly redirect the partial-download path so the agent changed ownership of a sensitive file. These vectors could result in root privilege escalation, arbitrary file modification, or denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 2026.27.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| qbee-io | <2026.27 | ||
| go: go.qbee.io/agent | <0.0.0-20260615134032-0fdf8e411de5 | 0.0.0-20260615134032-0fdf8e411de5 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in go.qbee.io/agent (Go), strongest first
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