Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks
Exploited in the wild, in CISA KEV since 2 Sep 2026 (due 16 Sep 2026), with 3 public exploits. No fixed version is recorded.
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope["server"]` for malformed values.
Briefing
Written from the sources below · deepseek-v4.1-flash
Starlette before 1.0.1 does not validate the Host header when reconstructing request.url, so a malformed header can make request.url.path differ from the requested path. Security checks in middleware or endpoints that rely on request.url instead of the raw scope path can be bypassed.
Why it mattersExploitation is confirmed and it is in CISA KEV with public nuclei templates and 70% EPSS, so attacks are likely and imminent.
ActionUpgrade Starlette to 1.0.1 or later; if unable, reject malformed Host headers at the proxy.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kludex | Starlette | <1.0.1 |
Exploit evidence
3 public sources
Coverage
News and research mentioning this CVE
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Starlette, strongest first
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