Starlette: Unvalidated request path concatenated into authority poisons request.url.hostname
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to 1.3.0, the HTTP request path is not validated before being used to reconstruct request.url. Because request.url is rebuilt by concatenating {scheme}://{host}{path} and re-parsing the result, a path that does not begin with / (for example @google.com) moves the authority boundary during re-parsing, so request.url.hostname and request.url.netloc become attacker-controlled. Code that reads request.url.hostname (rather than the Host header or scope) can therefore be misled into trusting an attacker-supplied host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.0.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kludex | Starlette | <1.3.0 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in Starlette, strongest first
Embed
A live severity badge for an advisory, README or ticket