Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0%. No fixed version is recorded.
Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ontola | >=0.30.0 <0.40.3 | ||
| cargo: atomic-server | >=0.30.0 <=0.40.1 |
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in atomic-server (Cargo), strongest first
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