Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)
No exploitation in the wild has been reported. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 1%. No fixed version is recorded.
Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, the Commit application path in lib/src/commit.rs allows an authenticated Agent to assign the server-managed internalId property to an owned resource without character validation. The /download handler in server/src/handlers/download.rs passes that value to filesystem path construction and NamedFile::open without sanitization, containment validation, or a File-class check, so traversal or absolute paths can read files available to the server process. Reading the server configuration can expose the root Agent private key and allow root impersonation with full read, write, and delete access to server data. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.
Affected
Vendors, products and packages with version ranges
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ontola | >=0.30.0 <0.40.3 | ||
| cargo: atomic-server | >=0.30.0 <=0.40.1 |
Exploit evidence
1 public sources
Timeline
Every event on this vulnerability
Related
Other vulnerabilities in atomic-server (Cargo), strongest first
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